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’Jeg véd jo nok’ – sagde han – ’at der skal være foregaaet et aandeligt Gennembrud i 
vore Dage. Jeg har hørt Tale om Gennembrudsmænd i Videnskab, Literatur og 
Kunst. Men det er endnu ikke lykkedes mig at faa Øje paa, hvad det egentlig er, der 
er bleven gennembrudt, eller hvad det er for Noget, der er brudt igennem.’ 
[‘I do know’ – he said – ‘that there is supposed to have been an intellectual 
breakthrough in our days. I have heard talk of ‘breakthrough men’ in science, 
literature and art. But I have not yet succeeded in seeing what has actually been 
broken through or what it is that has broken through.’] 
- Pater Rüdesheimer in Det forjættede Land [The Promised Land] (1891-95) by Henrik 
Pontoppidan  
 
Towards the crepuscular hour in both literal and figurative meaning, the aloof 
clergyman Rüdesheimer sits with Ragnhild, who was supposed to have been 
Emanuel Hansted’s chosen one, in the Danish Nobel laureate novelist Henrik 
Pontoppidan’s first long novel. The reader has been through popular religious 
revivals and fellowship meetings, parochial intrigues and the battle for the 
young political party of ‘Venstre’s’ soul. He has even experienced people’s 
willingness to join the evangelical-missionary side if it implies more power or 
enough to fill one’s (considerable) belly. Everywhere the reader has 
encountered dreamers and fantasts including the Quixotic type in the form of 
the protagonist Emanuel Hansted. We are dealing with men who are busy 
proclaiming the return of something old or the transition to something new. 
 
1 This article was originally written in Danish for the forthcoming publication Det historiske blik. En 
antologi om historiebrug of historisk metode (ed. Sofie Kluge, Ulla Kallenbach & Rasmus Vangshardt, 
Aarhus University Press). I should like to express my gratitude towards my fellow editors for 
accepting to let me publish it here in this English version.  
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This appears also to pertain to those who believe themselves to be 
representatives of the so-called ‘Modern Breakthrough’ in Danish history. And 
it is quite the question Rüdesheimer asks: What is it that has become new? What 
became old because something new arose? 
 
The Great Divide 
This longing to identify a break in history is not an exclusively Danish 
phenomenon. The latent desire for that place in history where we became 
‘modern’ and thus also ipso facto for a demonstration that we are placed on the 
right side of the divide is pan-European. It simultaneously constitutes a 
foundational problem regarding the role of history within the humanities. 
Historiography is laden with dreams of some such break. Pontoppidan 
masterly mocked the Brandesian terminology and the Grundtvigian epigonism 
of it on Danish soil, but it exists in countless forms and within most 
disciplines and genres.  
In one of my generation’s most defining movies, Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp 
Fiction from 1994, a Black mafia boss is sexually abused by two pale white men, 
one of them even a police officer. After having been rescued from the violent 
rape and having shot one of the officers in the abdomen, Marsellus Wallace says 
the now famous words which must necessarily torment any professor of the 
period, we have come to know as the Middle Ages: 
I’ma call a coupla hard, pipe-hittin’ niggers, who’ll go to work on the homies here with 
a pair of pliers and a blow torch. You hear me talkin’, hillbilly boy? I ain’t through with 
you by a damn sight. I’ma get medieval on your ass. (Tarantino 1994) 
What Marsellus has been exposed to seems to him so preposterous that 
the ‘modern’ condition, where we do not punish each other with pliers and 
blow torches, prohibits just retaliation. To ‘get medieval on someone’s ass’ is to 
stop being civilized, to suspend one’s own modernity. Apparently. 
Similar patterns can be observed in the area of academia. Medievalists 
have, at least since the 1970’s, been attempting to outdo each other when it 
comes to describing the problems, which followed in the wake of Jacob 
Burckhardt’s publication of Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien in 1860. 
Burckhardt’s famous claim was that medieval man “erkannte sich nur als Race, 
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Volk, Partei, Corporation, Familie“ and that in the Middle Ages, “die beiden 
Seiten des Bewusstseins – nach der Welt hin und nach dem Inneren des 
Menschen selbst – wie unter einem gemeinsamen Schleier träumend oder 
halbwach [lagen].“ (Burckhardt 1860, 131) 
Ever since, several strategies to overcome this abyss between the Middle 
Ages and modernity have been introduced, especially through the sprouting 
academic discipline of ‘medievalism studies.’ It is defined as “the post-medieval 
idea and study of the Middle Ages and the influence, both scholarly and 
popular, of this study on Western society after 1500.” (Workman, quoted after 
Fugelso 2009, 86) Many new medievalism studies concern themselves with 
public discourse and general media debate and describe how the public is 
influenced by the idea that you can describe contemporary practices – for 
instance honor killing, terrorism, the Guantanamo, young adults’ drinking 
habits or Muslim view on women – as ‘medieval’ when they represent a 
counterpart to everything ‘we’ would like to be: Civilized, mature, rational. 
(Patterson 1990, 92) 
The Burckhardtian metaphor of aging is recognizable: The medieval man 
was mentally childish; we have now become mature. In the Danish newspaper 
Jyllands-Posten, a reader wrote the following commentary in 2005 as a reaction 
to the honor killing of a young Pakistani girl: “Many people with Muslim 
background think and act humanely and will never accept medieval, Islamic 
treatment of women.” (Riazi 2005, my italics.) We must thus understand that 
one can (no longer) regard the people who lived in the Middle Ages as human. 
From Burckhardt through Pontoppidan’s Modern Breakthrough and 
Tarantino’s black mafia boss to contemporary media discourse, this urge 
towards modernity documents our own narcissism in the wish to stand on the 
right side of history, and it points to a utopian longing that everything must 
become new.2 We would then be able to escape the judgement that history must 
repeat itself, and we could at least break free of the sullied contingency and 
 
2 This tendency does not, of course, begin with historicism or the rise of the new media – I merely 
use these as illustrative examples. One could also argue that the tendency is observable with the rise 
of Christianity or with the French Revolution.  
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begin to move towards pure necessity. Our longing to (have) become modern 
is the dream of the end of history in the name of perfectibility.3  
The point of this diagnostic cross-section is not another medievalist’s 
attempt to rehabilitate the Middle Ages. On the contrary, the purpose of this 
essay is to discuss the role of history within comparative literature when we 
accept the idea that a time in history can be identified when ‘we’ became 
modern. It is in this perspective irrelevant whether one believes that this 
happened in the year 1345, when Petrarch found Cicero’s lost Epistulae ad 
Atticum in the library of the cathedral in Verona, or if it were to have happened 
in a lecture hall in 1871 at Frue Plads in Copenhagen. 
The main concern is to show that a possible reservation towards such 
dreams of modernity is not reactionary or ‘anti-modern’ but rather a 
counterweight to overtly confident descriptions of the uniqueness of the 
modern condition. Subsequently, I will argue that such a correction will not 
necessarily be achieved through more historicism, no matter if it comes from 
Basel or from Berkeley, but that it rather lies in the cultivation of the sense of 
historical continuity. It is not the same thing. What follows is not original but a 
reminder of the consequences for our relation to history when historicist ‘great 
divides’ are installed.   
In a metahistorical perspective, the present article demonstrates that 
identifications of radical rupture in history often work as an attempt to deny the 
role of the historical within the humanities and especially within the discipline 
of comparative literature; it furthermore argues that it also influences the 
possibility of general cultural criticism because it presupposes certain 
ontological assumptions of time and history and a specific idea of what ‘modern 
society’ is. The article concludes by discussing two strategies for a more 
coherent notion of literary history in C.S. Lewis’ historiographical essays and 
Bruno Latour’s theory of science respectively. This leads to a claim of the 
inevitability of history within the humanities: One cannot dispose of it, even if 
that was desirable; luckily, it is not. 
 
 
3 There are, of course, other ideas of modernity than this one, but the dream of the end of history is 




The historiographical logic of great divides can be observed within most 
national philologies. If we begin in Denmark, the urge towards identification of 
a great divide is clear in relation to the aforementioned ‘Modern Breakthrough’ 
as the Pater Rüdesheimer clearly senses. We are not dealing with a use of the 
Middle Ages as the ‘wholly other’ of modernity but a quite regular idea of the 
fact that Georg Brandes and the first generation of authors within the Modern 
Breakthrough introduced a final break in Danish literary history when ‘we’ 
finally grew up mentally. Certain of Brandes’ formulations, especially from the 
introduction to his lectures on ‘main currents’ in European literature from the 
19th century, have ever since been taken into account for the idea that a passing 
can be identified in Danish literary history from Romantic and superstitious 
childhood to enlightened and rational maturity. Even though Brandes’ lectures 
were about European currents, the words about what was happening ‘at home’ 
had immeasurable consequences. Brandes made the now familiar claim: “Dass 
eine Literatur in unseren Tagen lebt, zeigt sich dadurch, dass sie Probleme zur 
Debatte bringt.” (Brandes 1872, 8)4 This realism has been practiced extensively 
ever since. As I have documented elsewhere in the case of Henrik Pontoppidan, 
it is observable how an author, who was distinctly torn between romanticism 
and realism and who did not write literature which depicted any form om 
‘progress’ in the human spirit, is one-sidedly treated as a realistic author in all 
larger literary histories. This is even often done with precisely the argument that 
Pontoppidan was ‘modern.’ (Vangshardt 2017) 
Another Danish example is Anders Thyrring Andersen’s examination of 
later uses of Brandes in Danish historiography of literature. With his enormous 
work on Martin A. Hansen, Thyrring Andersen has documented how such 
different literary scholars as Torben Brostrøm, Peter Madsen and Anne-Marie 
Mai talk of the ‘transition’ from poets of the Heretica movement (Hansen, 
 
4 I quote in the German translation of 1872 because the standard English translation of 1906 did 
not include the full introductory chapter and thus missed this essential line of Danish literary 
history. It is of immense importance that Brandes’ life work not be reduced to this catch phrase. 
Brandes regretted that it had become so emblematic for his oeuvre and in 1916 in a letter to Francis 
Bull, he underscored that had just said it once and never repeated it. (Quoted in Knudsen 2004, 496f.) 
The point to quote it in the above is historiographical: It became the defining phrase of the Modern 
Breakthrough and a (telling) unfortunate evergreen in Danish histories of literature.  
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Frank Jæger, Ole Wivel) to a 1960’s modernist as Klaus Rifbjerg as the final 
transition to a  
vivid, reality-committed, internationally oriented and contemporaneous-conscious 
literature […] Brandes’ ideas about an internalization and modernization of literature 
was carried on by the young Brostrøm and his thoughts on a modernism, which was 
engaged with the new worldview, anthropology and modern psychology of its time, 
and thereby was able to criticize outdated forms of poetry. (Mai quoted after Andersen 
2015, 47). 
The passing from something outdated to something modern is clearly 
depicted. Now, the caesura is simply displaced to the year 1960. 
 
European Modernities 
In other European countries, literary historians have often been tempted to put 
the beginning of modernity at the moment the Germans often call ‘die frühe 
Neuzeit,’ the paradigm example being William Shakespeare (1564-1616) who 
was apotheosized in the Goethezeit. The case of Shakespeare and the dream of 
modernity has been thoroughly documented. Two reminders from different 
ends of the spectrum should therefore suffice. 
Harold Bloom’s worship of literary genius has with greatest popular force 
established the thought of Shakespeare’s ‘invention of the human.’ The claim is 
that before the early modern period, notions of the self as a morally accountable 
entity may have existed, but Shakespeare was the one to invent ‘personality:’ 
“Insofar as we ourselves value, and deplore, our own personalities, we are the 
heirs of Falstaff and of Hamlet.” (Bloom 1998, 4) In the other end of the playing 
field, Shakespeare is not in the same way the active creator of the modern self, 
but nonetheless he is the sublime expression of the sudden social genesis of it. 
Stephen Greenblatt, the founder of New Historicism, has thus in the same way 
become a proponent of the idea of modernity’s birth in the Renaissance and 
Shakespeare as this phenomenon’s distinct image. (Greenblatt 1980)5 
 
5 This also gives reason to a substantial clarification of terms. As the Danish historian Jes Fabricius 
Møller has noted in a forthcoming article not yet published, it creates confusion that the English 
language cannot easily distinguish between Historismus and Historizismus – a problem of course not 
made any less serious through the fact that Anglo-Saxon ‘New Historicism’ has its roots in 
Continental Historismus. It is, however, important to remember that Greenblatt’s New Historicism 
rightfully should be used as a token-form of the specific historiographical school of Historismus and 
not the type-form of Historizismus.  
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Even if the above examples of the specific framing of modernities are not 
accepted, the permanent urge towards historical logics of break is well 
documented. Both by those who renounce it and by those who practice it. That 
goes for C.S. Lewis with the description of the ‘great divide’ between the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance (Lewis 1944; 1969), Peter Sloterdijk, who in Sphären 
II describes the end of history and the latent radicality of modernity (Sloterdijk 
1999, 519),6 for Bruno Latour (1993 [1991]) with the telling title Nous n'avons 
jamais été modernes and for Rita Felski’s work to document the epistemology of 
modernism whereby she has called attention to the fact that “the 
quintessentially modern gesture [is the] disavowing and disclaiming [of] the 
past.” (Felski 2003, 503) The Chaucer expert Lee Patterson has called it 
“modernism’s purist erasure of history” (Patterson 1990, 88) and in this relation 
even gestured at the deconstructivist Paul de Man who also thought that “the 
cultural imperative of modernity” does not rely on a fixed or specific point in 
history but on the assumption of one break, no matter whether that be the 
Renaissance or 20th century modernism: “A desire to wipe out whatever came 
earlier in the hope of reaching at last a point that could be called a true present, 




Against these provisional forays in literary longings for modernity, it could be 
objected that they represent a thing of the past – so to speak. History has 
resolved the problem as we are no longer modern. Those who believe that we 
have lived through modernity will claim that we have hence moved on. I am of 
course here alluding to the postmodern revolt against cohesive explanation and 
grand scale stories about ourselves, especially known from Jean-François 
Lyotard’s La condition postmoderne. Rapport sur le savoir from 1979. If we have 
become postmodern, it is due to the fact that we no longer believe in myths of 
progress or in a telos of history and can thereby forget about old ideas of a ‘grand’ 
transition or a ‘deep’ break in history.  
 
6 In Denmark first pointed out by Goldbæk 2014, 220. 
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Against such a postulate of postmodernity as the cure for our longing 
towards breaks with the past, at least two objections can be made. Firstly, it is 
a fact that in general public discourses, in the ‘broad’ humanities and in recent 
literary histories, no one seems to tire of identifying the definitive break(through) 
in history. In a subjunctive clause to this argument, a Bruno Latour would also 
remind us of the logical impossibility of being postmodern if we have never 
been modern to begin with. (Latour 1993, 46) Secondly, it is important to 
remember on the general level that even if a postmodern condition were the 
correct description of our times, the foundational historico-philosophical 
problem has not changed: We are still epistemologically and existentially 
segregated from the world of ideas of the Middle Ages or from the time before 
the Modern Breakthrough: A historical abyss or great divide no. 2 has just been 
installed. Furthermore, the literary-historical mark of modernity is not a belief 
in ‘grand narratives’ in the plural; the original European myths are certainly 
premodern. Literary-historical modernity is the belief in exactly one grand récit: 
That we are different from all those who lived and wrote before the break. 
 
The Real Presence of History – and of Metaphor 
I mention these subjects to suggest the essentiality of ontological assumptions 
of history when dealing with works of art. There are at least three foundational 
problems with the described longing for modernity and an ontology of ‘breaks.’ 
Firstly, the curse of obsolescence seems to be the price to pay. As in the case 
of Anne-Marie Mai where Rifbjerg marks the abandonment of ‘outdated’ forms 
of poetry or as in the case of Greenblatt where everything before the year 1500 
becomes a terra incognita. (Patterson 99) This historical logic often has a 
pedagogical or didactical purpose. We build these boxes of periods for the 
students to learn how to play with them. But the price of this rectangular Bildung 
is equally high. If you have accepted these kinds of divides, the alienation effect 
of premodern texts is dramatically increased: How are you to defend the 
greatness of, say, the Danish Romantic N.F.S. Grundtvig’s poetry if you have 
just lectured the students on the Brandesian model of the childish state of 
Danish Romanticism? How to make them experience Beowulf’s torn mind 
between the lost life in the hall and the promise of future salvation if no 
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personality is to exist before the great divide? Something happens to our ability 
and possibility to teach and write about literary classics which suffer the 
unfortunate fate of being placed in the premature phase of our civilization. How 
are you to pass on the joy of great literature which has ended on the wrong side 
when historians of literature describe them as difference (in essence) from ‘us’? 
Their very existential truth potential is weakened in favor of teachable 
periodizations.7   
The problem can, however, not be reduced to one of didactics. We also 
must ask what happens to the possible experience of a common Europe of 
ideas beyond present-day politics if the historical logic of rupture and break is 
to be upheld; an experience which we might describe as a ‘European identity’ 
and which was erstwhile rather popular. It is an evident wish in more recent 
literary historiographies that a common-European identity be established 
beyond the national states and the national philologies which for so long were 
the natural habitat of comparative literature. What happens to the pan-
European primordial myths if they are essentially different from us or if history 
has ended? Ulysses’ adventures on the oceans with the purpose to learn man’s 
virtues and vices; Aeneas’ road from Troy to Rome; Hrothgar’s sorrow; Dante’s 
hell – and his Paradise. Logically speaking, this stems from a time annihilated 
in its absolute foreignness to us if the logic of break is sustained. They can at 
best stand as childhood memories in the windowsill: But there, you fade away 
when your function has been reduced to ornamentation or to stigma. 
The question is also what we are to do with ‘modern’ texts which articulate 
experiences of the coherence of history. In War and Peace, Tolstoy can upon first 
sight of Moscow let Napoleon see that “this city was evidently living with the 
full force of its own life. By the indefinite signs which, even at a distance, 
distinguish a living body from a dead one, Napoleon from the Poklonny Hill 
perceived the throb of life in the town and felt, as it were, the breathing of that 
great and beautiful body.” (Tolstoy 2010, 935)8 This is an unambiguously 
 
7 This line of argument is akin to Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s criticism of naturalized and ‘scientific’ 
views of history and to their arguments against overtly confidential views of human consciousness. 
See the end of the section ‘New Friends’ below for a consideration of the present argument’s 
relation to this tradition.  
8 Trans. Louise Maude, rev. Amy Mandelker. 
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metaphysical experience of a city and the reason for the following exclamation: 
“This Asiatic city with her innumerable churches. Holy Moscow.” (ibid.) The 
latter expression relates to either the mystical idea of Moscow as the ‘third 
Rome’ or the sense of Moscow’s historical continuation with Jerusalem – in the 
middle of the birth of literary realism. The past is not always that distant. If you 
are to understand Kutuzov or Alexander in this modern masterpiece, the 
premodern idea, known for example from the Aeneid’s story of the transition 
from Troy to Rome, is indispensable. It is harmful to ignore this fundamental 
continuity, but it is bound to become just that terra incognita which debars the 
moderns from such continuity. The modernist idea of history can therefore not 
only be harmful to the experience of the coherence of history but also brings 
with it a natural preference towards anti-metaphysical stances.   
To stay in the categories of example, the phenomenon is of course also 
identifiable in Denmark. A similar experience of historical real presence can be 
found in Martin A. Hansen, no matter how outdated he might be in certain 
versions of the great divide. Lykkelige Kristoffer (1945) activates an experience of 
all historical time’s unbroken continuity. In opposition to ontological over-
periodization (i.e. historicism) which would claim that Hansen too worked with 
absolute breaks in history – in Orm og Tyr he supposedly just established it before 
the Middle Ages – it should be evident that a novel like Lykkelige Kristoffer 
investigates heathen, antique and Judeo-Christian origins alongside the Nordic 
Middle Ages. They become present existential options and possibilities which 
do not mutually exclude each other. Kristoffer dies in the occupied Copenhagen 
of 1536 which becomes a “rainy Troy and Jerusalem.” By his spiritual mentor, 
he is told that “we all carry Troy in our hearts,” and his ideas of guilt, motivating 
his heroic deeds, are in accordance with Hansen’s notion of the Nordic Middle 
Ages. (Vangshardt 2018) In both a didactical and a European-intellectual scope, 
Tolstoy’s and Hansen’s experiences of what might be called ‘the real presence 
of intellectual history’ appear deeply desirable. It paves a way to put readers or 
students in contact with Troy, Jerusalem or Rome. Who does not see the 
necessity today to speak of this peculiar fusion of spatial and temporal unity 
across the continent? But categories of break de jure – if not de facto – make the 
belief in such real presence of history in existence and culture difficult.  
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The third foundational problem concerns the preconditions of beauty in 
historical prisms of modernity. In the beginning of the 1960’s, the philosopher 
Hans Blumenberg tried to develop paradigms for a metaphorology and thereby 
coined the term ‘absolute metaphors.’ (Blumenberg 1960, 22) His goal was to 
show that certain metaphors exist which cannot be reduced to their possible 
origin in rhetorical desires to ornament discourse with the purpose of 
persuasion: Beauty and purpose are, in other words, not of essential identity. 
Blumenberg’s point was that these metaphors seem to contain an ontological 
surplus which makes them resistant to rationality without losing their force of 
attraction on man – prior to and after the sexually mature period of the human 
spirit. Blumenberg’s examples are images of coherence between truth as light 
or power, the world as a stage or as a clockwork, fate as a travel or as s voyage 
on the ocean, nature as a book. One could also add life as a dream. The 
argument is foremost systematic; it is about metaphor and its semantics but in 
subordinate clauses, a paradoxical historical point emerges: These metaphors 
hold a more or less permanent place in the European literary canon, at least 
from Homer to Goethe. That is a period much longer than the period between 
Hamlet’s problematization of existence and the possible end of modernity in 
the middle of the 20th century. At the same time, these metaphors hold a 
historical potential as they appear to comprise a ‘remainder’ (Ger.: Restbestand) 
which has proven a counterweight to dreams of theorems of modernity. 
Blumenberg would see this point as a subtle correction of the logic of epochal 
difference rather than a proof of continuity. But his early metaphorology still 
implies a peculiar view of beauty; it is not subject to epistemological and 
historical rupture, especially not to those who wish that modernity be a Stunde 
Null in the transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance or from the 
‘feelings’ of romanticism to the ‘rationality’ of realism.   
Another way to formulate that is to claim that the alleged shift towards 
modernity’s mature rationality would make us blind to that which makes 
literature an autonomous source of knowledge. Bruno Latour can here be taken 
into account for a description of the paradox and a key definition of modernity. 
The moderns are, so Latour, all those people, no matter where they were born, 
who feel themselves pushed by time’s arrow in such a way that behind them 
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lies an archaic past unhappily combining Facts and Values, and before them lies 
a more or less radiant future in which the distinction between Facts and Values 
will finally be sharp and clear. The modern ideal type is the one who is heading 
– who was heading – from that past to that future by way of a “modernization 
front” whose advance could not be stopped. It was thanks to such a pioneering 
front, such a Frontier, that one could allow oneself to qualify as “irrational” 
everything that had to be torn away, and as “rational” everything toward which 
it was necessary to move in order to progress. Thus the Moderns were those 
who were freeing themselves of attachments to the past in order to advance 
toward freedom. In short, who were heading from darkness into light – into 
Enlightenment. (Latour 2013, 8f) 
If it is correct that we have transferred this pattern to the way we write 
literary history, it is self-evident that it must get rid of all that that which is 
‘irrational.’ And all of the mentioned Blumenbergian metaphors are. That is 
why they are absolute. It would also constitute an explanation as to why William 
Shakespeare or Henrik Pontoppidan necessarily must be placed on the modern 
side of history: Otherwise, we would have to part with them. They could and 
would no longer be our kindred spirits.9 
 
New Friends 
Medievalists have as mentioned long sensed the problems when a divide is 
established between their period and the Renaissance. But oddly, it is within 
another discipline that the criticism has reached a broader audience: 
anthropological science studies with a seemingly hypermodern thinker as the 
above quoted Latour. Latour is without a doubt the contemporaneous 
philosopher who has shown the greatest sense of this urge to identify a radical 
break in history. He reminds us that anthropology can document that the 
passage of time can – and has been – interpreted in a number of ways. The 
moderns have found their own: 
 
 
9 Patterson’s sarcastic expression for why we like Hamlet so much: “We recognize Hamlet as a 
kindred spirit: he expresses our modernity.” (Patterson 1990, 98) 
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The moderns have a peculiar propensity for understanding time that passes as if it were 
really abolishing the past behind it. They all take themselves for Attila, in whose 
footsteps no grass grows back. They do not feel that they are removed from the Middle 
Ages by a certain number of centuries, but that they are separated by Copernican 
revolutions, epistemological breaks, epistemic ruptures so radical that nothing of that 
past survives in them – nothing of that past ought to survive in them. (Latour 1993, 
68f) 
The powerful image of the modern Attilatic self-understanding is an 
efficient comparison and has a future within comparative literature but has not 
yet been developed as a diagnostic tool for the way literary history is written. 
Rita Felski, who never tires of quoting Latour, is probably the literary scholar 
who has come closest to an application of the term, but as her goal is 
systematical, not historical, there is still potential for further use. At the same 
time, Felski appears to be mostly concerned with the experimental avantgarde 
and the new pop art, but seldomly with the European canon. As she notes in 
the increasingly popular “Context stinks!” from 2011: 
The trick is to think temporal interdependency without telos, movement without 
supersession: pastness is part of who we are, not an archaic residue, a regressive force, 
a source of nostalgia, or a return of the repressed. Latour’s notorious assertion that we 
have never been modern does not dispute the fact that our lives differ from those of 
medieval peasants or Renaissance courtiers, but insists that these differences can be 
absurdly overdrawn, thanks to our fondness for fables of rationalization, the 
disenchantment of the world, the sundering of subjects from objects, the radicalism of 
modern critique, and other testimonies to our own exceptional status. (Felski 2011, 
578f) 
Even if it is a question that is not likely to interest Felski, it is relevant to 
consider which literary histories would have emerged from such an 
understanding of works of art, here especially those already canonized. When 
‘pastness’ is part of what we are, and not that which must be overcome, it could 
be that the same truth was observable in masterpieces which have become 
common to all Europe. The point in this case is that this could be a canonical 
perspective on a Felski idea on how best to deal with works of art. In this way, 
the new and quite widespread actor-network theory within the humanities 
becomes an odd couple together with a more traditional paradigm of historical 
continuity. Felski would perhaps herself be against that very concept of canon, 
but it is an example of her dream of ‘new friends:’ 
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Artworks can only survive and thrive by making friends, creating allies, attracting 
disciples, inciting attachments, latching on to receptive hosts. If they are not to fade 
quickly from view, they must persuade people to hang them on walls, watch them in 
movie theaters, purchase them on Amazon, dissect them in reviews, debate them with 
their friends. (Felski 2011, 584) 
It is paradoxical that the Felski who wanted to remind us that ‘pastness’ is 
part of our existence here only seems to be thinking in spatial networks. A factor 
almost entirely forgotten again is temporality, historical continuity, coherence, 
but the above-mentioned network expressions are of course applicable to the 
Bible, The Aeneid and The Divine Comedy. Felski’s main focus lies elsewhere, but 
might it not be a fruitful alliance with modern theory if historians of literature 
could show the relevance of a translation to the Anschauungsform of time? 
To the historical dimension of comparative literature, the concept of ‘new 
friends’ is simultaneously constructive. If comparative literary criticism is to 
gain new insight into the classics, which are part of what and who we are, it 
must have them make new friends. It is also in those odd couples that the 
division between ‘reaction’ and ‘progressivity’ in the critique of dreams of 
modernity could be overcome. Felski’s vocabulary makes it sound as if the self-
proclaimed dinosaur and ‘reactionary’ historian of literature C.S. Lewis has been 
transformed into one of her ‘new friends.’ In his inaugural lecture at Cambridge 
in 1954, he declared that:  
I do not think you need fear that the study of a dead period, however prolonged and 
however sympathetic, need prove an indulgence in nostalgia or an enslavement to the 
past. In the individual life, as the psychologists have taught us, it is not the remembered 
but the forgotten past that enslaves us. I think the same is true of society. (Lewis 1969, 
12) 
At the same time, Lewis used his lecture for just such an exercise in 
creating new friendships in literary history. For instance, he suggested that even 
though Gibbon saw the Christianization of the Roman Empire as the ultimate 
fall of cadence and thus was able to insert a great divide between the Antique 
and the Middle Ages, it would today be more relevant to see the kinship 
between The Aeneid and The Beowulf. They both describe a translation imperii in a 
literal and a spiritual sense respectively: From Troy to Rome, from life in the 
hall to life in Paradise. Lewis recognized the need for periodization but reshaped 
it through the idea of ‘new friends.’ It was not as radical as it could have been, 
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but the point remains: “Between Jane Austen and us, but not between her and 
Shakespeare, Chaucer, Alfred, Virgil, Homer, or the Pharaohs, comes the birth 
of the machines.” (Lewis 1969, 10) This was obviously a new ‘great divide,’ as 
Lewis himself would have sad, but it was also an expression of new flirts in the 
great canonical circle of friends.  
This little secret connection between Latour-Felski and Lewis is supposed 
to suggest two questions and a fact. Question 1. Which ‘new friends’ would the 
canonical texts make if we began to look for affinity and forgot the belief in the 
agents of history as prototypes of Attila the Hun? Question 2. Would such an 
approach not contribute to the reestablishment of a common-European frame 
of reference across the generations? Fact 1. We are here dealing with a 
possibility of staying within the tradition of canon thinking and ‘Great Books’ 
without being liable to accusations of reaction. In contrast to the common 
accusations against ‘the reactionaries,’ such a history of literature would enable 
a common-European experience of geographical and intellectual coherence. 
Moscow is after all only holy because it is connected to Jerusalem or Rome. 
And the idea of Rome was conceived on the shores of Troy – in present-day 
Turkey.  
A focus on the temporal aspect of the network would in itself not be 
original or new and is as such the expression of an older, Continental pattern 
of thought. The literary historiography of the German romantics practiced the 
idea of the power of imagination to create coherence across time. An example 
could be A.W. Schlegel’s lectures on dramatic art and literature (Schlegel 1817) 
or it could be the late romantic Joseph von Eichendorff’s literary history. 
(Eichendorff 1854) Another dynamic and cohesive idea of literary history can 
be found in Walter Benjamin’s theory of the German Trauerspiel (Benjamin 
1928), in E.R. Curtius’ transition history between Latin Middle Ages and 
European modernity (Curtius 1948) and in Erich Auerbach’s thinking on figura 
and mimesis. (Auerbach 1938; 1946). 
That also gives reason to another clarification. A stronger consciousness 
of continuity rather than break does not necessarily lead to the cultivation of a 
new metaphysics of presence where the immediate and unmitigated presence 
of meaning is worshipped. In the mentioned examples, we are rather dealing 
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with the suggestion that certain patterns, typologies, motifs and metaphors 
collide over time. It is in the encounter of texts between that which is foreign 
and that which is like that continuity arises. Just like a reader’s encounter with 
historical texts will be an experience of distance and closeness, present and past, 
at the same time. 
The denial of a possible charge of ‘presentism’ can also be supported by 
the affinity to modes of thought in modern Hermeneutical philosophy from 
Heidegger to Gadamer. The argument that we need more continuity and less 
rupture echoes Gadamer’s claim that “in Wahrheit gehört die Geschichte nicht 
uns, sondern wir gehören ihr.” (Gadamer 2010, 281) It might also seem to be a 
continuation of Heidegger’s insistence that “das Sein dieses Seienden [i.e. 
Dasein] durch Geschichtlichkeit konstituiert wird.“ (Heidegger 2006, 382) The 
reason for an explication of this philosophical kinship is that Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics (if not always Heidegger’s phenomenology) are not liable to 
charges of neither ‘presentism’ in the sense that it is contemporary interests 
which drive the interpretation of texts nor of claims of interpretational 
subjectivism. The temporal logic of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics as 
developed throughout Wahrheit und Methode is not the dominion of the present 
over past or future but an elaborate attempt to understand how the moment of 
interpretation is one of ‘deep temporality,’ where the temporalities of past, 
present and future enrichen each other. This is for example made clear in the 
lucid section on “Die Zeitlichkeit des Ästhetischen” in Wahrheit und Methode 
(Gadamer 2010, 126-133) and later on explicated in the essay on “Die Aktualität 
des Schönen” (Gadamer 1993, 94-142).10 In the wake of the publication of 
Wahrheit und Methode, E.D. Hirsch suggested that Gadamer’s use of the term 
“Applikation” (e.g. Gadamer 2010, 316) could lead to subjectivism. (Hirsch 
1967, 251) That is not correct. Gadamer’s hermeneutics presuppose the 
possibility that the foreignness of the text and its “überlegener Anspruch” 
(Gadamer 2010, 316) function as an exchange between past and present rather 
than the latter’s subjugation of the former. The same would go for the notorious 
concept of ‘prejudice.’ Along with application and the “Vorgriff der 
 
10 Heidegger’s phenomenology equally operates with such a unity of the ‘ecstasies of time.’ See e.g. 
Heidegger 2006, 328: “Die Zeitigung in der Einheit der Ekstasen.“  
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Volkommenheit,” they are neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad,’ they rather constitute the 
transcendental preconditions of “das Wunder des Verstehens.” (316).11 I 
conclude this consideration about ‘new friends’ with Gadamer and Heidegger 
because they show a way to see that an enhanced sense of historical continuity 
does not (necessarily) imply metaphysics or presence or straight-forward 
subjectivist presentism. They do however show there is no need to think of 
modernity as the annihilation of the past or the dominion of the present.  
 
Conclusion 
The point does not have to be that we have never been modern. But the point 
is that this modernity is ascribed wrong predicates when modernity means 
Attilatic trampling, for the past so clearly lives in us. Perhaps we have been 
modern, but this has not made history come to an end. History is inevitable, 
also within the humanities, and that is a good thing. It is not about generally 
accusing the moderns of lacking historicity. Greenblatt’s new historicism also 
has a concept of historicity – Jacob Burckhardt and Jules Michelet are the 
explicit role models.  In Greenblatt, it is just sign systems and social energies 
which make out the contextualization. In 1871, Brandes thought that there were 
historical reasons for the fact that Danish literature had remained reactionary and 
not yet swam in the dialectical wave which would unavoidably absorb the 
reaction and then lead to more realism. The historian Oswald Spengler was 
attentive to this determinism: “Auch die Verlagerung des Anfangspunktes ‘der 
Neuzeit‘ von den Kreuzzügen zur Renaissance und von da zum Beginn des 19. 
Jahrhunderts beweist nur, dass man das Schema selbst für unerschütterlich 
hielt.“ (Spengler 2017, 45)  
The problem is thus not a lack of historicity but the urge towards a hurtful 
version of it in form of hard historicism. To follow Rita Felski’s line of thinking: 
History does not consist in a series of closed boxes lined up next to each other. 
“History is not a box […] conventional models of historicizing and 
contextualizing prove deficient in accounting for the transtemporal movement 
and affective resonance of particular texts.” (Felski 2011, 574) In short: 
 




Historicism is rarely able to explain why certain texts, especially those which 
have become classics, have spoken and do speak to people across the centuries 
because historicism is essentially the closing of boxes. Thus, highly different 
historicist strategies – from Burckhardt over Greenblatt to the Danish tradition 
– paradoxically weaken the experience of historical continuity.  
The urge to see oneself separated from the past, both from the classical 
era and even more so from the pre-industrial, through epistemological breaks 
and Copernican revolutions (Latour), hurts our possibilities for true 
appreciation of the artworks handed down to us through history. It weakens 
the sense of the fact that the past is part of what we are. It is of greater 
importance to exercise the feeling of historical continuity than to teach the 
boxes of historicist contexts. Or, to put it in another way, as it is implied in 
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